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ON THE HORIZON OF HOSPITALITY 




ABSTRACT: A thrown stone raises the question of the position of authority and does so only by 
remarking us as responsible for our limits and their transgression, but it also raises the problem 
of boundaries. Are they natural, or are they inscribed in us? In Ancient Athens, boundary-
stones were inscribed with a word (horos) that raises the problem of definition by implicating a 
coincidence of meanings. These stones were never supposed to mark a boundary as an 
adamantine barrier proscribing transgression from one side to the other. And yet they did not 
for all that cease to be and mark a boundary. Although the identity between the stone and the 
word for boundary does not provide any answers as to how boundaries should be maintained 
or dissolved, it does raise the problem of the relation that the boundary engenders and the 
bond that it poses between two sides as a question of hospitality. 




When Edward Said visited Lebanon he picked up and threw a stone across the border 
to Israel, for this act he was barred from attending certain institutions. During the 
French revolution it was stones, the humble cobble, that were thrown against the 
troops and piled high to form the barricades. Again, in England, during the suffragette 
movement women wrapped stones in paper, tied a string to them and threw them at 
public offices, drawing the string to retrieve them. During the Al-Aqsa intifada in 
Palestine it was an iconic image of a young boy throwing stones, later killed by the 
Israeli army, that attracted the attention of the international media. In a simple protest 
in Athens against education cuts in 2008, it was a youth throwing stones who was 
killed by police and caused a general revolt. In Egypt during the recent uprising it was 
stones that littered the streets even as the military was sending in tanks. 
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Must we be satisfied in agreeing with Blanqui that the stone is the principal article 
in urban battles because it is most ready to hand?1 Or has the stone gathered this 
reputation for insurgency on account of history’s momentum, resurfacing every time 
because of its presence in the former revolt? As Lacan said, perhaps the stone has 
become an object petit a for the revolutionaries.2 For although we employ stones, 
crushing them down, piling them up, in the construction of buildings, roads and walls, 
here the stone, its content and form is in every way subordinated to the increasingly 
hostile environment we are building around us, blocking out strangers, ensuring 
swifter means of progress and limiting in every possible way the direct confrontation 
and interaction with our fellow men. And yet there is one place where the stone 
returns to its base material, and with it binds us in a direct relation with one another. 
That is, in insurrection.  
But what if the symbolism of the stone is not limited to these more recent acts of 
historical insurrection? What if the stone itself already marks out our responsibility to 
struggle for what we know to be right? What if the stone actually stands as a testament 
to what we cannot see in the immediate world around us but recognize nonetheless as 
presenting a most substantial challenge to the status quo exactly because something 
has been missed, overlooked, or simply lost? 
In the Ancient Athenian polis boundary stones proliferated. These stones can be 
identified from other stones by their inscription. They read ΗΟΡΟΣ. The word  horos 
(ὅρος) means ‘landmark’, ‘boundary-stone’, ‘boundary’, ‘limit’, ‘term’, ‘definition’, 
‘measure’, ‘rule’, ‘time’, ‘gravestone’. But that does not mean that horos ceases to be a 
simple stone, a stone that is simultaneously inscribed and described by the matter of 
language. Found in many contexts, from archaeology to philosophy, this word 
confounds any singular attempt to translate it or define it. It is at once the word for 
boundary and the name of the stone: a name that marks the distinction between word 
and matter. Although the horos marked a boundary, it was not for all that adamant. On 
the contrary, horos stood as a bond between one side and the other. It was meant to be 
read and therefore recognised as marking a boundary even though it never foreclosed 
the possibility of transgression. For in its stony presence, it always already raised the 
question of definition as a question of substance. Here we are working on the implicit 
hypothesis that words and things not only endure in a relation, but that the horos 
actually stands in for this relation as a boundary and limit, a point of division, 
simultaneously relating matter and language, the ‘stone’ with the word for ‘boundary’, 
1 Auguste Blanqui, Manual for an Armed Insurrection, trans. Andy Blunden, 2003 Available on-line: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/blanqui/1866/instructions1.html  (accessed Feb 2015). 
2 Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. Barbara Bray, New York, Columbia University Press, 
 1997, p336. 
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and providing the very material basis for their distinctions. The word itself refuses its 
abstraction from the material dilemma of the boundary, or, to be more precise, it 
raises the problem of the difference between word and material by always remaining 
between them and bringing them into distinction. Horos is a fence sitter, but this means 
that it presents us with a duplicitous problem, at once lexical and spatial. 
ONE HOROS SUFFICES 
In his History of the Peloponnesian Wars Thucydides states that ‘in the meeting of two 
armies one horos suffices’.3 Now it goes without saying that when two armies come face 
to face there is a presupposed boundary of contention between them, a boundary 
which has been brought into question by the fact of war. So long as the war rages, a 
boundary remains. But the problem here is exactly where this boundary is located, 
about which both sides are in disagreement. The location itself is at once the site of 
conflict and in conflict. In every sense it is over this very boundary that war is waged. 
But here we can understand the point of contention also as a unifier, where, in the 
words of Heidegger, ‘strife is not a rift, as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the 
intimacy with which opponents belong to each other’.4 But there is a significant 
difference between war (polemos) and civil war (stasis), because with war even though the 
boundary is in contention, it does not cease to be present as that which divides the 
hosts and unites them in hostility.5 In civil-war, however, there is not necessarily a  
distinct boundary that has been transgressed, there is no physical boundary (horos) 
within a singular community that divides it in two.  
Stasis derives its meaning from the word ‘to stand’, and we should understand this 
word as did the Greeks, as a point when a community ceases its usual motion, comes 
to a stand-still, comes up against a wall.6 Stasis itself fulfils the function of division 
where ever it arises, however this division is not linked to a particular place. It could be 
said to be the ethical experience of division. Vardoulakis states that ‘the temporality of 
stasis in relation to the theologico-political is intimately linked to the impossibility of 
fixing stasis to a particular locus’.7 Stasis is a creation of the community, within the 
community, that simultaneously calls into question the very character and unity of the 
community as such, so that, given its multivalence, ‘stasis has the capacity to disturb 
3 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Charles Foster Smith, Loeb Classical Library, London, 
Harvard, 2005, 4.92.4. 
4 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, London, Routledge, 2000, p188. 
5 Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical Library, London, Harvard, 1935, 470b. 
6 For a full study of the concept of stasis in Ancient Athens, see Nicole Loraux, The Divided City: On Memory 
and Forgetting in Ancient Athens, trans C. Pache and F. Fort, New York, Zone Books, 2006. 
7 Dimitris Vardoulakis, ‘Stasis Beyond Political Theology?’ in Cultural Critique, Number 73, Fall 2009, p142. 
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the mutual support of presence and absence’.8 Unlike the horos, the division in stasis has 
no immediate relation to a position, or the sacred, it is a political event even when it 
breaks in as an exception of authority and power. This non-positional aspect of stasis 
was disrupted by Solon when he passed a law that stated that in the case of civil-war, 
every man had to take up a side, thus outlawing the neutral position. In so doing he 
reminds us that what appears to be an exception to politics is simultaneously the 
ground for a new political relation, but a ground that provides neither a foundation 
nor a sovereign. The state of civil war issues in the possibility for an ethical and political 
relation, thus a ‘responsible politics is above all a politics that eschews the violent act of 
separation instituting the sovereign. Stasis solicits a politics of friendship’.9 
By instigating a law that would apply to this exceptional state, Solon placed 
himself not in the position of sovereign, but in the position of the mute and inanimate 
boundary. As he himself is quoted as saying, he placed himself not only in the position 
of the boundary, but as the boundary. 
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίῳ  
ὅρος κατέστην. 
I stood between them like a horos in no-man’s land.10 
In order to overcome stasis, Solon intervened as horos, making himself into the 
boundary that would at once allow and force a division within the city that could then 
be overcome by the community and reinstate a normal condition to the body politic 
which would subsequently be reformed. The horos raises the question of space by 
putting the middle place into contention and materialising what is common to either 
side; i.e. the boundary. The horos raises a topography of contraries while 
simultaneously bringing these contraries together, and uniting them in its own 
material. It is the matter that puts both difference and similarity into question and 
provides the point at which the one can transgress into the other. The (albeit 
personified) horos in the case of Solon meant that what was static could be manipulated 
into returning to motion and bringing about a condition of unity. In a sense, by taking 
his place on the boundary in the state of exception, but refusing the role of sovereign, 
Solon transformed the civil-war into a simile for war. All he had to do then was to 
absent himself and the city could be reunited. 
8 Vardoulakis, ‘Stasis Beyond Political Theology?’, p127. 
9 Vardoulakis, ‘The Ends of Stasis: Spinoza as a Reader of Agamben’ in Culture, Theory and Critique 51(2), 
2010, p155. 
10 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, with The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices. trans. H. Rackham, Loeb 
Classical Library, London, Harvard, 1967, 12.5 (author’s translation). 
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READING BOUNDARIES 
In the ancient city and its surrounds the horos was found along roads, between counties, 
marking graves, and at the entrance to sacred sites and sanctuaries. Generally, it was 
to be found in public, but in the 4th century it was adopted to demarcate private 
property subject to a mortgage of sorts.11 Nonetheless, the horos describes a boundary 
line that is not wholly representative of dimension. There is no certainty that the horoi, 
in their earlier manifestation, were supposed to be linked between one another in 
order to describe a closed boundary or a fenced-off region.  
One should hardly imagine a continuous line drawn by means of numerous stones. 
More probably they stood at key points, at corners and where streets entered; here 
they would clearly say to any disqualified person, “Thus far and no father.”12 
But how sure can we be that this stone presented a prohibition? The horos itself has 
no imperative attributed to it. The boundary stones of the agora may have signified a 
region into which the atimoi, those who had committed patricide and were therefore 
considered ‘unclean’, were not permitted to enter, and one would assume the horoi that 
marked temple lands would have performed much the same function. And yet, the 
horos that marks a grave, the horos that marks the boundary between one county and 
another, not to mention the horos in the philosophical text that describes the work of 
definition or determination, none of these suggest any kind of prohibition. The 
problem that adheres to the horos is not that of prohibiting transgression so much as it 
is that of marking a boundary which otherwise would not be recognised. If it is a 
matter of recognising boundaries, is this not rather a problem of reading? That is, is 
not this boundary found in us because we read it as such? 
Horos is the same word that appears in the Septuagint to describe the stone which, 
according to Deuteronomy, ‘men of old placed as a boundary upon the land’.13 Here, 
the term ‘boundary’ is used without any reference to prohibiting transgression: ‘Thou 
shalt not remove thy neighbour’s landmark (ὅρια)’, insist the Levites shortly after 
11 Studies to date that investigate the horos as a marker of ecumbrance are, John Fine, ‘Horoi: Studies in 
Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens,’ in The Athenian Agora 8, American School 
of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951; Moses Finley, Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200BC: the 
‘horos’ inscriptions, New Jersey, New Brunswick, 1952; Edward Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in 
Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society, and Politics, New York, City University Press, 2006, pp163-241; Gerald 
Lalonde, ‘Inscriptions: Horoi, Poleitai Records, Leases of Public Land’, in ed. Merle K. Langdon, 
Michael B. Walbank, The Athenian Agora, vol.19. New Jersey, American School of Classical Studies, 1991, 
and Lalonde, ‘Horos Dios: An Athenian Shrine and Cult of Zeus’ in Monumenta Graeca et Romana Vol.XI. 
Leiden, Brill, 2006. 
12 Homer Thompson and R.E Wycherly, The Agora of Athens: the history, shape and uses of an ancient city center, 
The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, New Jersey, Princeton, 1972, p118. 
13 Deuteronomy 19:14, interlinear translations and interpretations from the Septuagint and King James 
Version. Available on-line: http://biblehub.com/interlinear/ (accessed Feb 2015). 
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prohibiting graven images, ‘which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which 
thou shalt inherit in the land that the Lord thy God giveth thee to possess it’.14 Again in 
Proverbs, ‘Remove not the ancient landmark, which thy fathers have set’ (μὴ μέταιρε 
ὅρια αἰώνια ἃ ἔθεντο οἱ πατέρες σου).15 The Hebrew term is לובג g ĕbuwl, 
translated by the Greek horion, though more frequently in the plural form horia,  the 
neuter noun of the masculine horos, as it is throughout the Septuagint. The Hebrew 
comprises a similar ambiguity to the Greek; the noun has multiple meanings ranging 
from ‘boundary’, ‘limit’ and ‘line’ to ‘land’, ‘area’ and ‘territory’. The primitive root of 
the verb (לבג) means at once ‘to bound’ and ‘to border’ as well as the added Hebraic 
causative verbal stem, the Hiphil stem, where the effect caused is indirect or mediated, 
‘to cause to set bounds’, generating the alternative translations of the noun as ‘wall’ 
and ‘territory’.16 In translation the term encapsulates the coincidence between the 
boundary and the mark. For example, in Deuteronomy, ἐπικατάρατος ὁ μετατιθεὶς 
ὅρια τοῦ πλησίον, ‘Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour’s landmark[s]’.17 If 
there is any prohibition here it adheres to the stone itself, the place of the stone as 
such, and the prohibition is directed not against crossing the boundary, but removing the 
stone. 
The ‘name’ of the stone in the Greek cannot be separated from the inscription, nor 
can the name of the stone be separated from the word for boundary. Horos is both 
stone, inscription and boundary. These three terms coalesce in the single name ‘horos’. 
In which case any reference to such a stone, would also suggest the implicit presence of 
the boundary. If there is a boundary that is recognised by those on either side, the 
stone itself functions as the mark of this mutual and common act of reading. The stone 
is a boundary, marked and marking. Can we separate that which marks the boundary 
from the boundary itself, given that they are both signified by a single word? Does 
either side of the boundary take its peculiarities from the boundary, or do their 
differences generate the boundary? What comes first; spatial opposition or the position 
in between? If the stone was ‘placed’ then we could, along Hegelian lines, 
conceptualise this landmark as the point that negates space. And yet in the horos the 
point is confused with the line, as much as the word is with the stone.  
14 Deut 19:14. 
15 Prov. 22:28. 
16 Bruce Waltke and Michael Patrick O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, Winona Lake, 
Eisenbrauns, 1990, p433. 
17 Deut. 27:17 
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THE FIRST LAW 
It is not only a spatial problem that is thus raised, but a legal one. For we must ask who 
placed the horos, to whom the boundary belongs, and, thus also, who stands to either side, 
divided and opposed? And, then consequently, who is expelled or made the exception 
of the boundary? These last questions, however, are only raised secondarily to the 
boundary. The first question that is raised and remains with the boundary as what 
belongs to the horos is not the generation of space on either side, but the question of 
difference, the question of similarity that remains with the boundary. The horos raises 
the question of space by putting place into contention and materialising what is 
common to either side, so that the boundary is the ‘common term’ (κοινὸς ὅρος) even 
though either side differ.18 The horos raises a topography of contraries while 
simultaneously bringing these contraries together, and uniting them in its own 
material. It is the matter that puts difference into question, by posing the question of 
what is common. 
In The Laws Plato states that the prohibition against removing boundary stones is 
the first law of Zeus, punishable twice over, first according to the justice of the gods, 
then by the laws of man. 
The first law, that of Horos Zeus [Διὸς ὁρίου] shall be stated thus: No man shall 
move earth’s horoi, whether they be those of a neighbour who is a native citizen or 
those of a foreigner (in case he holds adjoining land on a frontier), recognising that this 
is truly to move the immoveable; sooner let a man try to move the largest rock which is 
not a horos than a small stone which marks the boundary between friendly and hostile 
ground under the oath of the gods. For of the one Kinship Zeus is witness, of the other 
Foreigner Zeus; who, when aroused, brings wars most hostile. He that obeys the law 
shall not suffer the evils which it inflicts; but he who despises it shall be liable to a two-
fold justice, first and foremost from the gods, and second from the law.19 
Could it be assumed that every horos is the mark of the omnipresence of this Zeus 
of the horos? On the outskirts of Athens there was a temple to an unknown Zeus 
marked by a horos of this name, dated amongst the oldest of the Athenian horoi, bearing 
the rupestral inscription ΗΟΡΟΣ : ΔΙΟΣ [retrograde] (horos of Zeus). As one 
epigraphical study suggests,  
18 Aristotle, The Categories, with On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, trans. Harold P. Cook and Hugh Tredennick, 
Loeb Classical Library, London, Harvard, 1962, 4b20. 
19 Plato, Laws, trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, London, Harvard, 1967, 843A-B (author’s 
translation). 
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this “Horos of Zeus” is a type of abbreviated marker of shrines, in which the 
word ἱεροῦ or τεμένους is either understood as part of the meaning of hόρος, 
and a byname of the god was perhaps assumed as known.20 
The implication is that the horos, by marking the site, consecrates it, and is coterminous 
with the sacred quality of the place it identifies. If we take this to apply to all horoi we 
could assume that any boundary-stone to be recognised as such must be the guiding 
thread of the sacred; it need not be accompanied by a prohibition as it already stands 
in order that the sacred remain inviolate, and in this case any boundary could be said 
to be ‘sacred’. Therefore, as Plato informs us, the first law must be the prohibition 
against the transgression of the boundary-stone, and he who is guilty of moving horoi is 
guilty of attempting to remove the very stones that draw up the boundaries, that define 
the boundaries (and here we see the verbal form of the horoi, ὁρίζοντα) sanctioned in 
oath by the gods (ἔνορκον παρὰ θεῶν). And not only this, for, just as the boundary-
stone of Deuteronomy was not to be removed from the boundary, so here in the Laws the 
removal of the stone is also a trespass on logic, to move the immoveable (τὸ τἀκίνητα 
κινεῖν). 
It is essential to note that neither the stone nor this first law prohibit the 
transgression of the boundary. The intention is not the prohibition of people passing 
from one side to the other, but rather it has to do exclusively with the material of the 
boundary itself, with the boundary as marker. It is a law that does not deal with people’s 
movements but with the matter of marking the boundary, or the terms of the 
boundary. It is not we who are prohibited from crossing the boundary, it is the 
boundary itself that must remain without motion, and, being put out of motion it is 
thus beyond human authority, making it at once an object of divine justice and 
corroborated by the law of man. It would be wrong to assume that this law, given its 
divine sanction, is therefore not a human law. It may not be inscribed on the tablets of 
the city, but this does not mean that it is not inscribed. The law of horos Zeus is, 
properly, topographical. It is written into the land as the first law of the land, the first law 
that protects the laws of logic – it draws up the boundaries between the possible and 
the impossible in language. This law thus finds its true topothesia in language, in logos.  
It is a linguistic boundary that the horos marks. Not only because the word itself 
means ‘definition’ and therefore marks that point where the definition of one word is 
at once separated off from other words while simultaneously relying on them, and thus 
crossing over into further definitions. But also because as the boundary between two 
peoples, or two regions, it marks the linguistic barrier, the point of difference between 
kin and stranger. More likely than not, it is where two different languages meet, where 
20 Lalonde, ‘Horos Dios: An Athenian Shrine and Cult of Zeus’, p6. 
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two different customs or codes find their point of confrontation, a place where one 
must take care not to offend. A certain danger adheres to the boundary, but only if one 
is not welcome on the other side. That is because the relation that the boundary 
describes can never be entirely determined. Despite the solidity of the stone, the 
boundary must be recognised by both parties on either side in order for it to be 
maintained as such, otherwise the boundary itself becomes not a point of definition, 
but a site of hostility, of undetermined contention. The boundary itself would come 
into question. This is how we should understand Plato’s law. For if the boundary is 
maintained in friendship, it can be transgressed and yet remains in place. The boundary 
that is maintained and protected out of fear and aggression always already calls into 
question the boundary. The boundary marked by walls and barriers insinuates a 
question: if the barrier was not protected by military surveillance and arms, could its 
character as boundary be maintained? Would it still be recognised as a boundary? The 
barrier already implies that the boundary is not legitimate, because it is not agreed upon 
by both sides, it is not common to both sides. The word horos also means ‘term’, and 
here we can see that the boundary, although it is the mark of difference, also stands as 
a common term, it is exactly the boundary that is shared, and held in common by 
either side. The legitimacy of the boundary-stone is not first and foremost prescribed 
by law, rather it is written and read as a common understanding. 
The single stone protected by Horos Zeus comprises the internal confrontation or 
conjunction between two other epithets of Zeus named by Plato as Zeus of kinship 
(ὁμόφυλος Ζεὺς) and Zeus of hospitality (ξένιος). The boundary-stone here gives 
definition to the difference between kinship and hospitality by drawing up a secondary 
relation, that between friend and enemy (φιλίαν τε καὶ ἔχθραν). This second relation 
belongs to hospitality, xenia, which is the friendly relation one has with strangers. The 
word for ‘stranger’, xenos, is also that of ‘guest’ and includes the obligation to play 
‘host’, also xenos. Kinship Zeus must be presumed to protect relations within, i.e. on this 
side of, the boundary while Xenios Zeus stands guard over the relations between here 
and there, that is, between strangers; there where we cannot be told apart except by 
what defines us in common. We are, both of us strangers to one another. Our identity 
is pure reduplication: xenos xenos. But there is a boundary that nonetheless separates us 
and offers us the possibility of transgressing over into difference, of welcoming one 
another and introducing ourselves as something more than strangers, of learning the 
other’s, and also giving ourselves, a name, place, heritage and so forth.21 This 
boundary is the possibility of xenia, of the hospitable relation. The stone demands what 
21 Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, p25. 
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the text prohibits, at least in regards to crossing over, or the maintenance of friendly 
relations. But, then, this can occur only if we both recognise the presence of a 
boundary that makes us both strangers, one to the other. 
Of course, this interpretation coincides perfectly with the archaeological history of 
the horos, which states that a horos is differentiated from other stones only insofar as it is 
read as such. The horos is the stone that is distinguished from the ‘natural’ stone according 
to logos, (whether inscribed or not) it is called horos. The question, therefore, of the law is 
not here a question of authority or authenticity, of who wrote the law, in whose power 
the law resides. The question that must precede any question of writing is deflected by 
the question that the stone itself raises, which is: who reads the horos? Who recognises 
the boundary? The difference that is thus generated by the horos is between those who 
read the horos as horos and those who fail to do so. This division takes place as the basis 
for the laws of the land which subsequently belong to whomsoever has the capacity to 
distinguish them.  
 In this case, there is something mutual about the boundary. A boundary that is 
not in contention becomes a common bond, a boundary that divides, yes, but also a 
bond that permits transgression so long as it is transgressed in friendship. 
Therefore the horos gives onto, and gives only onto hospitality, to the possibility of 
two different people sharing something in common, even if this is none other than the 
boundary itself which divides them. It suggests a bond to those who transgress it in 
friendship, whether they belong to the same tribe or are bound in a relation of 
hospitality with that tribe. But it exactly ceases to be (read as) a boundary the minute 
that it is crossed in enmity, because in that case the aggressor simply doesn’t, or refuses 
to recognise it as such. Thus, the horos raises the question of hospitality and puts 
hostility out of the question. But this is because the question of hospitality itself already 
raises the possibility of hostility. In the words of Plato, the horos draws up the boundary 
between friendship (philia) and hostility (echthra). Of the former kinship Zeus is 
protector, of the latter xenios Zeus, hospitality Zeus. This is no archaic Schmittian 
parallel maintaining a distinction of estrangement between friend and enemy.22 On the 
contrary, since the horos binds these two epithets it singularly permits, or rather demands 
a relation that as such both makes possible and proscribes enmity. Hostility is only 
possible under the protectorate of xenios Zeus, as the possibility of hospitality failed, 
transgressed, perverted. Hospitality and hostility are not contraries, the latter is, rather, 
dependent upon the former as an inherent possibility. If hostility isn’t experienced as a 
22 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 
2007. 
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possibility, hospitality ceases to be something freely given. This is the definition (horos), 
the horizon of hospitality.  
WITHOUT HORIZON 
Derrida states that when it comes to hospitality there is an opening without horizon.23 
It is no coincidence that he uses the word ‘horizon’ to explain this point. For horizon 
functions in two senses here. On the one hand, it is the perspective that we share, in 
the Husserlian sense, it demarcates the limits within which live. It describes our world 
as one lived in a common and expandable relation to and between the objects that 
surround us.24 But the word horizon is also derived from the word horos, it is the verbal 
adjective that the Greeks used to describe the circular boundary that embraces the 
world, ὁ τοῦ ὁρίζοντος κύκλος, ὁ ὁρίζων κύκλος.25 The horizon is what gives 
definition, what marks the limits of our world, drawing up the boundary between the 
world and the heavens. 
Is this horizon experienced as a limitation? It is certainly a limit, just as the horos 
itself can be translated as ‘limit’, but perhaps a limit that does not act as a restriction as 
such. And we must not fail to note the etymological link between the horizon and the 
horos, as if the nominal horos was put into action in the spectral limits of our world. 
Without this limit (horos), a term that must be read even though it provides no terms as 
such, hospitality retains the possibility of offering itself as hostility. But the horos is also 
the limit that asserts that hospitality must remain hospitality. Without such a limit, in 
the absence of some kind of term or boundary, the idea of hospitality is meaningless. 
Here we could say, then, that the horos is necessary for hospitality, opening up the 
possibility of transgressing boundaries, of coming to terms with confrontation, whether 
in friendship or enmity, before any conditions are placed upon guest or host as to 
whom is accepted or with what intentions the boundary is crossed.  
We say ‘horos’, and this marks out the difference between a mere boundary and a 
mere stone: horos is exactly that which comes in between, it describes that difference 
but only because it is read by us. Hospitality proceeds from this limit, opening up or 
breaking through the horizon to further transgression and abuse. Thus Derrida 
suggested that ‘pure’ or ‘unconditional’ hospitality is an aporia, it always contains the 
23 Derrida, ‘Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ in ed. Richard 
Kearney and Mark Dooley, Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, London, Routledge, 1999, 
p70. 
24 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1978, p184. 
25 Aristotle Meteorologica, trans. H.D. P. Lee, Loeb Classical Library, London, Harvard, 1962, 
363a27; On the Heavens, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Loeb Classical Library,  London, Harvard, 1960, 
297b34. 
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possibility of flipping over into its opposite, or of failing to be given.26 And 
consequently a ‘pure’ hospitality, is, as Derrida states ‘without horizon’, we could say it 
remains always on the boundary – that thin line – because it is the limit point as such 
(horos) that is itself unlimited. 
If, however, there is pure hospitality, or a pure gift, it should consist in this opening 
without horizon, without horizon of expectation, an opening to the newcomer 
whoever that may be. It may be terrible because the newcomer may be a good person, 
or may be the devil: but if you exclude the possibility that the newcomer is coming to 
destroy your house – if you want to control this and exclude in advance this possibility 
– there is no hospitality. In this case, you control the borders, you have customs 
officers, and you have a door, a gate, a key and so on. For unconditional hospitality to 
take place you have to accept the risk of the other coming and destroying the place, 
initiating a revolution, stealing everything, or killing everyone. That is the risk of pure 
hospitality and pure gift, because a pure gift might be terrible too.27  
If we read this horizon as what remains of the horos in the present day then we can 
accept Derrida’s conclusion that Hospitality appears as an aporia, a problem that does 
not permit passage, literally a- ‘without’, -poros ‘passage’. It is a problem that must 
remain irresolvable because what marks the boundary is exactly the task of reading, of 
the mutual recognition of the boundary. And the boundary is therefore either 
maintained because it is held in common, or transgressed because it is disputed. But 
that is not the real issue, for it is easy enough for those who are privy to the boundary, 
for those who are able to read the stone, to choose in what manner they cross the 
boundary. But how does the boundary stand for the real foreigner, the foreigner who 
does not, because he cannot, read the stone as boundary, the foreigner who is 
unfamiliar with the laws of the land and therefore transgresses the boundary 
unwillingly, unwittingly or without the wherewithal to act in accordance with the laws 
of the land, and always at risk of defying the first law? This is where ‘pure’ hospitality 
is found, exactly where the boundary comes into question, not because it is revoked or 
removed, but simply because it is not read as such. Hence the horos, in being 
unperceived by the foreigner, signifies something beyond its own definition, term and 
limit. The horos itself always comes in between friendship and enmity, it is itself an open 
definition, but nonetheless material. The horos always remains with the boundary as 
the only position to which no determinate position belongs, and it is in this absolute 
relation with the boundary as such that we are all of us strangers.  
26 Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993, p11. 
27 Derrida, ‘Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ in ed. Kearney, p70. 
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THE QUEST(ION) OF HOSPITALITY 
The horos stands as and marks out the aporetic structure of hospitality, or, better, it 
provides a horizon in contention, a boundary of confrontation, where the aporia of 
hospitality, the problem itself can be raised. Thus hospitality’s ‘purity’ is based upon a 
certain boundary, which always presents itself as a risk. So long as the horos remains 
and is unmoved, this problem refuses solution, because so long as the boundary is 
observed there will always be those on one side, and those on the other. And then 
hospitality always remains as a possibility, whether offering it or receiving it, and so 
does hostility. If we put hospitality into question- as something that we might not give, 
if we conceptualise it not as a gift but as a right that must be permitted or held back, if 
we refuse it to some or place conditions on how it is to be received, then we put the 
boundary out of question. The boundary that does not remain open ceases to be 
mutual, it becomes proper to one side or the other, and ceases to be a boundary as 
such, it becomes a barrier and the boundary as such is deferred. And by being 
deferred, it is subject to question. Ironically enough, then, the state that privileges 
entry to some and refuses it to others can be seen to undermine the very existence of its 
own borders.   
We can thus offer an alternate reading of Plato’s first law against the removal of 
the boundary-stones by suggesting that it is not the transgression of the boundaries as 
such, but the transgression of the hospitable relation that rouses Zeus Xenios to inflict 
wars. Hostile is he who estranges himself from the obligation to play guest-host, not 
only to be the generous, bountiful host, but – and this is the harder – to be a stranger, 
to let oneself be defined as the other of the other.28 This indebtedness (of self) to other is 
inscribed upon the land, both boundary and bond that cannot be proscribed or 
prohibited. Rather, as the question that would put the law of the ‘same’ out of play, it 
demands transgression by virtue of a certain  similarity between guest and host that 
nonetheless remain in a common estrangement. Any relation with the stranger 
automatically puts one in the parallel position of stranger, and it is this universal 
notion of estrangement that binds men.  
Hospitality always has the possibility of giving onto friendship and enmity, hence 
Derrida’s neologism ‘hostipitalité’.29 The horos, however, gives only onto hospitality. In 
this case, however, the horos is not itself an aporia. It is not a problem, or a question as 
such, even though it gives onto or raises problems. If it is read as boundary then it is a 
boundary, if it is not read as such it retreats into its identity as stone. And, as Plato 
28 Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, California, Meridian, 
1999, p23. 
29 Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’, in Acts of Religion. ed. Gil Anidjar, London, Routledge, 2002, p356. 
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says, to move the largest stone that is not a horos is just fine. The assumption being that 
we already know which is which. 
The point is that when it comes to reading the boundary-stone one is not at liberty 
to choose sides. One simply finds oneself on one side or the other, or else, a man is so 
foreign that he can’t even recognise the horos as such. The horos however is distinctly 
present as material and at once belongs to the past, standing as a rule that the present 
also belongs to the past. It is what gives distinction to he who reads the horos as a 
boundary, and he who doesn’t. Without this mark there would be no difference 
between you and me, mine and yours, but nor would there be any frontline of battle, 
no boundary to fight over. 
 It is in this light that the insurrectionary stone-throw should be understood. 
For it is an act directed against the hubristic violence of the border and the barrier, the 
wall and property. The stone-throw gestures towards what is common by putting such 
boundaries into question and by transgressing them with the most stolidly inanimate 
material. For the stone-throw yet retains the possibility of the dissolution of the 
militarized border, or the armed aggressor. It is a symbol of friendship winning out 
over hostility, of offering out a hand for embrace in hospitality. All who wish it are 
welcome to join the insurrection. The problem every insurrection faces is, however, 
how long the people are prepared to fight guns with stones, before the injustices they 
have suffered compel them either to turn inward in despair and accept the terms of the 
victor, or to embrace the same means of violence as are directed against them. The 
thrown-stone raises the question of the boundary that separates us from them. But it 
also raises the question of lost bonds. By giving material form to both question and 
loss, the mere stone offers us alternate measures and social ties that would bind us to 
the destruction of the forces which occupy and seek to manipulate us and the archaic 
frontiers of our life. 
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